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RETHINKING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Lino A. Graglia* 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges1 provides a particularly impressive demonstration of both 
the power of the Supreme Court and of the fact that it is based 
entirely on a ruse. Even for Americans unfortunately grown used 
to having radical cultural changes decreed by the Court, it should 
be impressive that the Court could by a margin of one vote decree 
that “marriage” no longer means the union of one man and one 
woman and deprive fifty state legislatures and Congress of the 
power to have it retain that meaning. At the same time, it could 
hardly be clearer that the decision, as Chief Justice Roberts 
pointed out in dissent, has nothing to do with the Constitution.2 It 
is an egregious example of the Court’s usurpation of legislative 
authority. To accept it without protest is in effect to accept a 
change in our form of government, from the system of 
representative self-government in a federalism with separation of 
powers created by the Constitution to government, to a large 
extent, by the Supreme Court. If leaving the final decision on basic 
issues of domestic social policy to the Court is seen as an 
improvement on the constitutional system, it should at least be 
openly identified and justified as such, not put forth as required 
by the Constitution. Obergefell presents an apt and timely 
occasion to reconsider the basis of the Court’s current role in our 
system of government, the power of constitutional judicial review. 
Constitutional judicial review is the extraordinary power of 
judges to invalidate policy choices made by other officials of 
government on the ground that they are prohibited by the 
Constitution. Evaluation of the power should begin with 
recognition that all constitutional restrictions on policy choices by 
government are problematic in a democracy in that their effect is 
	
 * A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 2626 
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to substitute policy choices made by people in the past for the 
different choices preferred by people of today. It is not rational to 
decide a current issue of public policy, for example gun control, 
by seeking to determine the views of people from a time when 
many of the relevant considerations, including the nature of guns, 
were very different. Further, many constitutional restrictions, 
such as the “natural born Citizen” requirement for the 
presidency,3 often serve only to needlessly create problems. If the 
norm is self-government, constitutional restrictions should be 
disfavored, not expanded or multiplied. 
The principal problem with the power of judicial review, 
however, is not judicially enforced constitutionalism, which raises 
the problem of rule by the dead, but judges abusing the power by 
holding unconstitutional policy choices that the Constitution does 
not clearly forbid, which raises the problem of rule by judges. The 
Constitution, a very short document, was wisely meant to 
preclude very few policy choices.4 Most constitutional cases 
involve state, not federal, law and nearly all of them purport to be 
based, like Obergefell, on a single sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which the Court has wrongfully converted from a 
guarantee of basic civil rights to blacks to a grant of virtually 
	
 3. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1. 
 4. The original Constitution prohibited both the federal government and the states 
from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws or granting any Title of Nobility, which 
prohibitions have raised few policy issues. The most important restriction on state 
policymaking was the prohibition of impairing the obligation of contracts, i.e., enacting 
debtor relief laws, which the Court effectively read out of the Constitution in Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), so that Minnesota could help 
farmers during the Great Depression—an excellent illustration that constitutional 
restrictions may be bad ideas. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), provides a more recent example of the 
Court reading out of the Constitution a provision found to be inconvenient; (Art. I, §4, ch. 
1, requiring that redistricting be done by the state legislature). In addition, the Bill of 
Rights prohibits confiscation of property by the federal government and grants a qualified 
right to “keep and bear arms.” 
The Constitution provides very little to interpret and has very little to do with the Court’s 
making of constitutional law. This does not prevent constitutional theorist and Yale law 
professor Jack M. Balkin from asserting that if the Court would just adopt his “theory of 
constitutional interpretation and construction,” its rulings of unconstitutionality would 
have “fidelity to the original meaning of the constitution” and be “faithful to the principles 
that underlie the text,” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). These rulings, 
he would boldly have us believe, would then no longer be simply expressions to the 
Justices’ political preferences. The study of constitutional law enables one, apparently, to 
believe three impossible things before breakfast. 
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unlimited policymaking power.5 The Court thereby gave itself the 
power to remove from the ordinary political process any policy 
issue (libel law, term limits, abortion) it chose and assign it to itself 
for final decision. The result is to make the Court the most 
powerful institution of American government in terms of 
domestic social policy, thereby depriving the states of the 
“Republican Form of Government” guaranteed them by the 
Constitution6 and undermining representative self-government 
by giving citizens less and less reason to participate in the political 
process. 
The effect, as Judge Learned Hand famously protested, is to 
create a system of government similar to Plato’s government by 
philosopher kings7 except with the philosophers replaced 
(unfortunately) by lawyers to maintain the fiction that the 
decisions are based on the Constitution. The decisions are 
necessarily based on only the Justices’ policy preferences, 
however, when, as is almost always the case, they undertake to 
invalidate as unconstitutional a policy choice that the Constitution 
does not clearly forbid or, typically, even refer to. That these 
decisions are based on ideology, not law, should also be clear 
enough simply from observation of the current Justices’ highly 
predictable voting patterns, with one group of four8 consistently 
voting for the “liberal” result and another group of four9 voting 
almost as consistently for the “conservative” result, almost 
regardless of the issue. Although presumably equally competent 
	
 5. The Court has done this primarily by converting the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (prohibiting a state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law”) from a guarantee of procedural regularity to a 
grant of authority to the Court to invalidate any limitation of liberty (i.e., any law) it 
considers “unreasonable.” See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum 
ten-hour workday); Roe v. Wade, 4190 U.S. 113 (1973) (restrictions on abortion). See 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948). Similarly, it converted 
the amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (prohibiting a state from “deny[ing] to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”) from a guarantee to blacks 
of police protection equal to that of whites to a grant of authority to the Court to invalidate 
any legal discrimination or classification (i.e., any law) it considers “unreasonable.” See, 
e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365 (1971) (alienage). See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT, 347–49 (1985). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 7. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
 8. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia 
Sotomayor. 
 9. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and 
Samuel Alito. 
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to read the Constitution, the two groups consistently reach 
directly opposite conclusions as to its meaning, and their 
conclusions, even more remarkably, are almost invariably 
consistent with their apparent political preferences.10 
The result of this situation is, of course, to make the vote of 
the ninth Justice, Justice Kennedy, decisive. Thus, the 
“Constitution” gives us an individual right to own a gun,11 
prohibits Congress from restricting corporate campaign 
contributions,12 and prohibits public school districts from 
considering race to increase integration in assigning students to 
schools,13 because in each of those cases Justice Kennedy chose to 
vote with the four conservatives instead of the four liberals who 
took the opposite position. On the other hand, the Constitution 
prohibits the states from imposing term limits on their federal 
representatives14 and, as we have just learned, restricting marriage 
to one man and one woman,15 because in those cases he voted with 
the liberals, with the four conservatives left to dissent. The result 
is that in a nation of over 300 million people, the most basic and 
controversial issues of domestic social policy are ultimately 
decided by the vote of one unelected government official, leaving 
the rest of us diminished, the ultimate in rule by an elite that the 
Framers sought to abolish. 
Judicial review, unknown to British law where Parliament is 
supreme, is not specifically provided for in the Constitution. It was 
defended by Alexander Hamilton16 and established by Chief 
Justice Marshall17 with the expectation, no doubt, that it would be 
a conservative force, as it proved to be for most of its history, 
serving primarily to protect property and contract rights. Its 
legitimacy was therefore severely questioned by liberals.18 The 
ultimate success of the 1954 Brown decision,19 prohibiting racial 
	
 10. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A 
Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32 (2005). 
 11. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570 (2008). 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 598 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 13. Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 14. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1999). 
 15. Obergefell, supra note 1. 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78. 
 17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 18. See, e.g., LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932); HENRY STEEL 
COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS (1943). 
 19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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segregation, however, followed by a series of other society-
changing decisions uniformly moving social policy to the left by 
the Warren Court (e.g., criminal procedure,20 prayer in the 
schools,21 pornography,22 libel23) and the Burger Court (e.g., 
abortion,24 busing,25 capital punishment26) convinced many liberal 
constitutional law scholars and others of the superiority of 
policymaking by the Court to policymaking by elected 
representatives. Some of the Court’s more recent decisions, 
however, such as Bush v. Gore,27 seemingly settling the year 2000 
presidential election controversy in favor of the Republican 
candidate, and Citizens United,28 removing restrictions on 
corporate campaign contributions, plus the near death of the 
Affordable Care Act29 and the Court’s hostility to affirmative 
action,30 have caused some prominent academic supporters of 
judicial review to have second thoughts,31 perhaps making 
consideration of a means of limiting the Court’s power a realistic 
possibility. 
Alexander Hamilton’s defense of judicial review on the 
ground that the Supreme Court, having, he argued, “merely 
judgement,” not will, and “no influence over either the sword or 
the purse,”32 was the “least dangerous” branch of the federal 
government,33 has proved to be entirely mistaken. Alexis de 
	
 20. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). 
 21. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 22. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
 23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 25. Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board Of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 26. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 27. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 28. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 29. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus’s. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 30. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. De Stefano, 129 
S. Ct. 2658 (2009).  
 31. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 32. See JOSHUA M. DUNN, COMPLEX JUSTICE: THE CASE OF MISSOURI V. JENKINS 
(2008). But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (authorizing a federal district judge 
to order state officials to raise taxes and, in one of the most impressive demonstrations of 
the Court’s power, approving orders by the judge requiring the expenditure of over 
$1,000,000,000 in a futile attempt to induce suburban parents to send their children to 
Kansas City public schools). 
 33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78. 
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Tocqueville’s insight that the Court was, on the contrary, 
potentially the most dangerous34 proved to be prescient when the 
Court’s Dred Scott decision,35 invalidating a congressional 
compromise on the slavery issue, confirmed his warning that an 
imprudent decision could lead the country to civil war. That one 
decision should have been enough, one might think—as perhaps 
should also the Court’s more recent decisions on abortion, forced 
busing, and same-sex marriage—to establish that judicial review 
is not an improvement on democracy. 
Obergefell shows, Justice Alito stated in dissent, that 
“decades of attempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of authority 
have failed.”36 That was and is no doubt inevitable given the 
current understanding of judicial review as effectively authorizing 
the Justices to substitute their policy preferences for policies they 
strongly disapprove that are adopted in the ordinary political 
process. The Justices’ effective lifetime tenure makes them more, 
not less, susceptible than other government officials to the 
corrupting effect of unrestrained power. The availability of 
impeachment and the Court’s dependence on Congress for 
enforcement of its decisions have not provided the complete 
assurance against the Court’s abuse of power that Hamilton 
expected.37 The Justices know that they have no reason to fear 
impeachment or that their decisions will not be enforced. Seeking 
Supreme Court nominees willing to assert their commitment to 
judicial restraint—our only present method of addressing the 
problem—is clearly not effective. 
Judicial review could be eliminated, as it has been in, for 
example, the Netherlands, by constitutional amendment.38 
Because judicial review, much less judicial supremacy, is not 
explicitly provided for in the Constitution, however, an 
amendment should not be necessary. In theory at least, Congress 
	
 34.  “The President, who exercises a limited power, may err without causing great 
mischief in the state. Congress may decide amiss without destroying the Union, because 
the electoral body in which Congress originated may cause it to retract its decision by 
changing its members. But if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent or bad 
men, the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 192 (Francis Bowen ed., 1862). 
 35.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 69 U.S. 393 (1896). 
 36.  Obergefell, supra note 1, at 2642. 
 37.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 81. 
 38.  Gw. art. 120. 
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could announce the view, contrary to the view of the Court,39 but 
in agreement with Thomas Jefferson,40 and James Madison,41 that 
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution is not superior to 
that of Congress. Congress could then officially express the view 
that the Constitution does not prohibit the states from refusing to 
recognize same sex unions as marriage and that Congress, 
therefore, will not act to enforce such a prohibition. As radical 
and drastic as this may sound, an assertion of legislative over 
judicial supremacy should not be shocking—should be seen as 
essential—in a republic. The immediate effect will be that the 
decisive vote on national policy and the policy of each of the states 
on this issue will no longer be in the hands of a single unelected 
government official. 
The question presented by judicial review is not the question 
endlessly and misleadingly debated by constitutional law scholars: 
How should the Court interpret the Constitution? Very few, if 
any, rulings of unconstitutionality turn—any more than in 
Obergefell—on an issue of interpretation. The issue is simply who 
should decide issues of basic public policy, a question of the 
proper form of government. Should they be decided by the 
process of representative self-government, usually on a state-by-
state basis, created by the Constitution or by majority vote of a 
committee of nine unelected, life-tenured lawyers pretending to 
interpret the Constitution in Washington, D.C.? The effect of 
abolishing judicial review would be not to lessen the importance 
of the Constitution, but to reestablish it as the basis of our system 
government. 
 
	
 39.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 40.  Thomas Jefferson, 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 142 (“[E]ach of the 
three departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the 
constitution.”). 
 41.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (“[N]one of [the three departments] ought to possess, 
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others.”). 
